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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1987-1988

A Faculty Symposium

ADMIRALTY
Marie R. Yeates*
Phillip B. Dye, Jr.**
Michael D. Fisse***

JURISDICTION

In a series of recent decisions, the Fifth Circuit has taken a restrictive view of the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear actions brought
under section 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA). 1 The court in May v. Transworld Drilling Co.2 declared

that in order to sustain jurisdiction for an action based on section 5(b),
the plaintiff must assert a claim for a maritime tort. The court reasoned
that since Congress, in enacting section 5(b), did not intend to create
a new or broader cause of action than that which existed under the
general maritime law, a claim under section 5(b) did not enlarge admiralty jurisdiction; nor would section 5(b) serve to establish federal
operation jurisdiction. Hence, the test traditionally employed to determine jurisdiction in maritime torts-locality and flavor-also determines
whether the federal court has jurisdiction over a claim under section
5(b). The plaintiff's claim must independently pass this two pronged
test in order to gain federal court jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, later announced the same rule
in Richendollar v. Diamond M. Drilling Co.' The court held that
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admiralty jurisdiction over a section 5(b) action depends on whether
the plaintiff shows that the underlying tort is maritime. According to
the court, jurisdiction cannot rest on the plaintiff's mere assertion of
a claim under section 5(b) but turns on the facts alleged in the complaint.
These facts, the court stated, must satisfy the same requirements of
locality and flavor that must be met in order to maintain an action
under maritime jurisdiction. If the facts alleged do not satisfy those
4
requirements, the plaintiff cannot bring his action under section 5(b).
DAMAGES
Settlements and Damage Awards
In Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan,5 an injured longshoremen brought
an action against the vessel interests to recover damages for personal
injuries that he sustained when hit by falling sacks of rice. The vessel
interests impleaded several third-party defendants, who thereafter settled
with the plaintiff. Under the terms of the settlement, the plaintiff would
reimburse the settling defendants if the plaintiff's recovery against the
vessel interests exceeded a certain amount.
At trial, the settling defendants alleged that the vessel interests had
been negligent. The district court, sitting without a jury, found the
vessel interests liable under section 5(b). The court then assessed the
negligence of the plaintiff at five percent and that of the vessel interests
at ninety-five percent. It did not, however, make any findings as to
the fault of the third-party defendants. The final damage award exceeded
the amount stipulated in the reimbursement clause of the settlement
agreement.
On appeal, the vessel interests claimed a credit against the amount
of the judgment based on the settlement. The vessel interests conceded
that, under Leger, they were not automatically entitled to such a credit.
They argued, however, that for purposes of the judgment, the dollar
amount of the settlement should be deducted from the total damages
awarded to plaintiff. The court agreed and, citing the Eleventh Circuit
decision in Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 6 reduced the
plaintiff's award dollar-for-dollar by the amount received in the settlement.
The Hernandez decision may have interesting implications for the
comparative fault reduction rule of Leger v. Drilling Well Control,

4. See Margin v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 812 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1987).
5. 841 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.), opinion corrected on denial of rehearing, 848 F.2d 498
(1988). The decision in denial of rehearing does not touch upon the questions covered
in this article.
6. 832 F.2d 1540 (l1th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Chevron Transp. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2017 (1988).
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Inc. 7 In Leger, the Fifth Circuit held that where the plaintiff settles
with one joint tortfeasor before suit, the remaining tortfeasor may
obtain a reduction in the judgment against him. The Leger court computed the reduction according to the percentage of fault that the trier
of fact attributed to the settling defendant. The Leger court expressly
refused to allow the nonsettling defendant to take instead a dollar-fordollar reduction based on the amount paid by the settling defendant.
The Hernandez result plainly conflicts with Leger, leaving the question of whether an adequate basis for distinction exists. The Hernandez
opinion did not contain any indication that the shipowner had pleaded
or had proved any negligence on the part of the third-party defendants
or that the third-party defendants' negligence had even been submitted
to the court. Thus, one basis (and perhaps the only basis) for distinguishing Hernandez from Leger is that in the former, unlike the latter,
the court neither considered nor ascertained the percentage of fault
attributable to the settling defendant. In the absence of such a finding,
the Hernandez court, in order to take into account the settlement and
to prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, allowed a set-off for
the dollar amount of the settlement.
Hernandez raises interesting questions concerning whether a nonsettling defendant can now "elect" to take a dollar-for-dollar credit
for the amount of the settlement, rather than a set-off based on the
settling defendant's proportionate fault, merely by failing to obtain a
fact finding concerning the settling defendant's degree of fault.
Interest
Postjudgment Interest
Prior to the recent amendments to the federal interest statute, 8 it
was well-settled that the statute did not apply to diversity cases. In the
recent case of Freedline v. Luxemburg, 9 the federal court for the middle
district of Louisiana, over a forceful argument to the contrary, concluded that these amendments did not affect the long line of precedent
holding that the statute applies only in nondiversity actions. According
to the court, postjudgment interest in a diversity case continues to be
governed by state laws that fix the rate of legal interest. The court's
decision in Freedline brings it into direct conflict with the Eleventh and
Eighth Circuits, both of which have held that the amended federal
interest statute applies to all cases, regardless of the basis for juris-

7.
8.
9.

592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
28 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. 1988).
682 F. Supp. 311 (M.D. La. 1988).
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diction.10 The Fifth Circuit has so far declined to rule on this issue." l
Prejudgment Interest
It is well-settled that prejudgment interest is not recoverable in an
action brought under the Jones Act. 12 In the recent case of McPhillamy
v. Brown & Root, Inc.,3 the Fifth Circuit considered whether prejudgment interest should likewise be denied when the claimant couples
a Jones Act claim with another type of claim that ordinarily permits
an award of such interest. In that case, the claimant brought both an
unseaworthiness claim and a Jones Act claim against his employer.
After finding the employer negligent and the vessel unseaworthy, the
jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in
punitive damages. When the district court denied his demand for prejudgment interest, the plaintiff appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment denying
prejudgment interest because the jury found damages on the Jones Act
and unseaworthiness claims without allocating its award between the
two claims. ' 4 According to the McPhillamy court, a plaintiff is not
entitled to prejudgment interest in cases in which he submits both Jones
Act and unseaworthiness claims to the jury, unless the jury apportions
the damages between the two claims. Because those claims often arise
out of the same incident, the court noted, the jury may find it difficult
to apportion damages between them.
In those maritime cases in which the plaintiff may obtain prejudgment interest, one important question is whether, and if so how,
that interest should be compounded. In Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 5
the federal district court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that
in an admiralty case prejudgment interest should be compounded annually. The court reasoned that this rule promotes the spirit and intent
of the general principle of maritime law permitting the awarding of
prejudgment interest for purposes of restitution and full compensation.
The court was persuaded that there is little justification for distin-

10. See Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan Carpet, Inc., 723 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1983); G. M.
Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526 (lth Cir. 1985).
11. Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 832 F.2d 326, 330 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987).
12. Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1969); Barrios
v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1972).
13. 810 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1987).
14. The Fifth Circuit has disapproved awarding prejudgment interest in a Jones Act
case tried to a jury. Barrios, 465 F.2d 1157; Sanford Bros., 412 F.2d 958. Accordingly,
a plaintiff recovering on both causes of action would be entitled to interest only on the
damages resulting from unseaworthiness.
15. 664 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
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guishing between prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest awards
in the manner of calculation.
Discounting Damage Awards
The United State Supreme Court recently decided a case that may
have some bearing on the application of the rule of Culver v. Slater
Boat Co.' 6 In Culver, the Fifth Circuit reviewed several different methods for determining the discount factor, including the below-market
discount method, the case-by-case method, and the total offset method.
The court held that the trier of fact must adjust the damage award to
account for inflation according to the below-market discount rate method.
In Monessen Southwestern Railway Co. v. Morgan,7 a state court
judge instructed the jury that it was legally bound to apply a zero
discount rate in determining the present value of the injured employee's
future lost earnings. On review, the United States Supreme Court held
that the instruction improperly took from the jury the fact-finding
function of determining the appropriate discount rate. The court stated,
however, that the judge in an FELA case"8 is not entirely precluded
from assisting the jury in present value calculations. A judge may
recommend to the jury one or more methods of calculating present
value so long as the court does not in effect preempt the jury's function.
Culver would appear to be consistent with the Monessen ruling that
the judge is free to propose one or more methods of calculating present
value provided he does not subject the jury's estimate to rigid mathematical limitations.
SEAMEN

Prerequisites
The split among the courts of appeals regarding the proper definition
of the term "seaman," as it is used in the Jones Act and general
maritime law, has not the escaped the notice of some members of the
Supreme Court. In a dissent from a denial of certiorari in International
Oilfield Divers, Inc. v. Pickle, 9 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, discussed the conflict among the lower courts and noted
that the Fifth Circuit has taken an expansive view of seaman status.

16. 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
17. 108 S. Ct. 1837 (1988).
18. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986). Jones Act decisions
often follow FELA rules. Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1020, 96 S. Ct. 457 (1975).
19. 479 U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987).
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According to the Fifth Circuit, one need not be engaged in or assist
20
in the transportation function of a vessel in order to enjoy that status.
Other courts of appeals, however, have rejected this view, holding
instead that one can qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act2 l or the
general maritime law only if one is aboard a vessel and one's primary
purpose is to aid in its navigation. 22 Noting that there is even disagreement within the Fifth Circuit on this point, 23 the Pickle dissenters
argued that the Court should have granted certiorari to settle the
dispute.24
Recent decisions from the Fifth Circuit demonstrate the court's
attempt to inject some degree of certainty into the law governing the
requisites for seaman status under the Jones Act or the general maritime
law. Under the general test for seaman status outlined in Offshore Co.
v. Robison, a maritime worker either must be permanently assigned to
a vessel in navigation or must perform a "substantial part" of his
work on a vessel or fleet of vessels in order to qualify as a seaman. 25
Of increasing significance in the application of this test is the percentage
of total work time that the alleged seaman spends on a vessel or fleet
of vessels.
In a series of recent Fifth Circuit decisions the court has implied
that this requisite is not satisfied where the worker spends less than
26
twenty to thirty percent of his time aboard a vessel or fleet of vessels.
27
In Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., for example, the court found
that the worker, who had spent twenty to thirty percent of his work
time on board various ships as a welder, did not perform a "substantial
portion" of his work on a vessel and consequently did not attain
seaman status. One year later in Lormand v. Superior Oil Co. 28 the

20. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); Barrett v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
21. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S. Ct. 1180 (1985); Simko v. C & C Marine
Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S. Ct. 64
(1979).
23. Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1076 (Gee, J., specially concurring).
24. Pickle, 479 U.S. at 1060, 107 S. Ct. at 940.
25. Robison, 266 F.2d at 779.
26. See Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (twenty to
thirty percent); Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 739 (1988) (fourteen percent); Miller v. Rowan Companies, 815 F.2d 1021
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988) (five percent); see also Pizzitolo v.
Electro-Coal Transfer Corp., 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1013
(1988) (twenty-five percent of work time aboard vessels was not a substantial portion
of work time).
27. 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986).
28. 845 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 739 (1988).

ADMIRALTY

19881

court refused seaman status to another welder on closely parallel facts.
The Lormand welder had spent only fourteen percent of his total work
time on vessels. The Lormand court concluded that a finding of seaman
status was necessarily precluded because the plaintiff had spent pro29
portionally less time aboard vessels than had the Barrett plaintiff. It
remains to be seen whether the percentage yardstick of Barrett and its
progeny will form the basis of district courts' summary judgments or
judgments n.o.v. on the question of seaman status in the future.
In order to satisfy the Robison test, the worker must show not
only that he performed a substantial percentage of his work on vessels,
but also that he worked on a consistent basis with one vessel or "an
identifiable group of vessels acting together or under one control." 0
The latter requirement, known as the fleet of vessels concept, had been
expansively read by the Fifth Circuit. In Bertrand v. International
Mooring & Marine, Inc.3" the Fifth Circuit stated that if a worker
performs duties on several different vessels, he need not necessarily
show actual common ownership or control of those vessels in order to
satisfy the fleet of vessels requirement.3 2 Recent decisions, however,
suggest that the court is retreating from that position.
In Langston v. Schlumberger Offshore Services, Inc.3 the plaintiff
performed approximately thirty-two percent of her work on fifteen
different vessels maintained by ten unrelated owners.3 4 The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment that plaintiff was not
entitled to seaman status. Similarly, in Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun,
Inc. ,3"the court affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiff lacked
seaman status because the twenty-three special purpose drilling rigs that
plaintiff had worked aboard neither were commonly owned or controlled
nor shared a common nexus sufficient to warrant classifying them as
"a fleet." 3 6 To the same effect is Ardleigh v. Schlumberger, Ltd.3 7 In
that case the plaintiff worked for a company that provided wireline
services for numerous movable drilling vessels and fixed platforms in
the Gulf of Mexico. During the course of his forty missions, the plaintiff
worked on thirty different vessels and that vessel work accounted for

29.

Lormand, 845 F.2d at 541.

30.

Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1074.

31.

700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983).

32.
limited
by the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 245. It is significant that the Court's statement in Bertrandwas apparently
to situations where the different ownership or control of the vessels was dictated
employer rather than by the nature of the claimant's work.
809 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id.at 1194.
831 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 556.
832 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1987).
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nearly seventy percent of his offshore time. Nonetheless, the court held
that the plaintiff was not a seaman because he neither was permanently
attached to nor performed a substantial amount of his work on an
identifiable group or fleet of vessels.38
In addition to clarifying the requisites for seaman status, the Fifth
Circuit has indicated that in some circumstances, an application of the
Robison test for seaman status will not be required. In Pizzitolo v.
Electro-Coal Transfer Corp.,39 the court ruled that a maritime worker
engaged in one of the occupations expressly covered by the LHWCA
is, ipso facto, ineligible for Jones Act benefits. Therefore, an application
of the Robison test is unnecessary.4 The court later reaffirmed this
ruling in Williams v. Weber Management Services, Inc.41 In that case
the district court found that the plaintiff, who had been hired to perform

repair work on a barge, was covered by the LHWCA and therefore
Jones Act. The Fifith Circuit, citing Pizzitolo,
could not sue under the
42
upheld this judgment.

The Walker-Reinhart Doctrine
Under the Walker-Reinhart doctrine, a ship's officer who breaches
his own personal duty to maintain the ship in a safe condition may

not recover damages for any injuries he suffers as a result of that
breach of duty. 43 Many courts have critized this doctrine and still others
have restricted the scope of its application." Recently, the doctrine was

38. Id. at 934. The Ardleigh decision is also significant with respect to its support
for the proposition that, at least in the Fifth Circuit, wireline operators are not Jones
Act seaman even where they may spend a significant amount of time on seagoing vessels.
39. 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
40. Id. at 982-83.
41. 839 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 1041. Accord Thibodeaux v. Torch, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D. La.
1987) (claimant engaged in loading a vessel at time of injury is covered by the LHWCA
and is ineligible for benefits under the Jones Act). It has been observed that an application
of Pizzitolo and its progeny would lead to incorrect results if taken to the extreme. For
example, most blue water seamen spend much of their time performing repair work on
vessels-an occupation expressly covered by the LHWCA. See, Diamond, Rough Seas
Ahead for Admiralty Law? Trial, Aug. 1988, at 44, 46.
43. Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952); Reinhart v. United
States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Peyman v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914, 95 S. Ct. 1572 (1975); Dixon v. United
States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955).
44. See, e.g., Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 n.]
(9th Cir. 1966); Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-OG Australielinie Wilhemsens DampskibsAktieselskab, 332 F.2d 651, 654 n.1 (2d Cir. 1964); Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois's Sons
Co., 275 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815, 81 S. Ct. 45 (1960);
Mason v. Lynch Bros., 228 F.2d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1956); Boat Dagny, Inc. v. Todd,
224 F.2d 208, 211-12 (1stCir. 1955).
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further limited in 6Villars Seafood Co. v. Vest45 and Snow v. Boat
4
Dianne Lynn, Inc.
In Villars, the captain of a vessel sustained injuries when the ladder
he was climbing gave way. The evidence established that while a safety
device that would have prevented the accident had been removed from
the ladder, the condition of the ladder was such that the captain could
47
not have readily discovered the danger by mere casual visual inspection.
On appeal, the court sided with the captain. According to the court,
the Walker-Reinhart doctrine does not apply to situations in which the
injured ship's officer neither engaged in misconduct nor had actual
4 8
knowledge of the existence of the unseaworthy condition.
In Snow the unseaworthy condition that gave rise to the injury
existed prior to the commencement of the ship's voyage. 49 The court
concluded that the Walker-Reinhart doctrine should not be extended to
such situations. To extend the doctrine in this way, the court reasoned,
would eliminate one of the foundations of the seaworthiness doctrinethat the owner's duty to supply a seaworthy ship is nondelegable. 50
TIME BARRING

No general statute of limitations existed in maritime law prior to
1980, and only the equitable doctrine of laches barred stale maritime
claims. In 1980, Congress enacted a three-year limitations period, 46
U.S.C. 763(a), for all personal injury or death suits arising from a
maritime tort. Several recent cases discuss both the retroactivity of
section 763(c) and its applicablity to maintenance and cure claims.
A Fifth Circuit case, Cooper v. Diamond M. Co.,5 involved both
problems. Cooper was injured in 1979, before the effective date of
section 763(c), but continued working until 1983. In that year (more
than four years following the accident) Cooper brought suit for personal
injures and a claim for maintenance and cure. The Fifth Circuit held
first that a claim which accrues prior to the passage date of section
763(a) remains viable for three years after the date of the statute's
enactment. The court stated that such a result would not unconstitutionally infringe on a vested right because the statute allowed a reasonable time for those affected by it to assert their rights.
Cooper's maintenance and cure claim did survive, however. That
claim did not accrue until Cooper ceased working in 1983, and thus

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

813 F.2d 339 (11th Cir. 1987).
664 F. Supp. 30 (D. Me. 1987).
813 F.2d at 340.
Id.at 343.
664 F. Supp. at 34.
Id.
799 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2177 (1987).
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suit was brought well within the three-year period. The Fifth Circuit
did not clearly state whether the three-year period applied by force of
section 763(a), or as a presumptive reasonable period under the doctrine
of laches.
Later, the Eighth Circuit relied on the constitutional discussion in
Cooper in deciding whether section 763(a) could apply to an unseaworthiness claim that had accrued shortly before the effective date of
section 763(a) but was not sued upon until seven years after the accident.
52 that court decided
In Reynolds v. Heartland Transportation,
that the
plaintiff had been afforded reasonable opportunity to sue before the
statute cut off his rights, and that hence, no constitutional problems
arose from the application of the three-year period to his claim.
The federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan
attempted to claiify a question that Cooper failed to resolve in Reed
v. American Steamship Co.5" The question for the Reed court was
whether section 763(a) applied to a claim for maintenance and cure.
Noting the ambiguity of the Cooper decision on this point, the court
4
held that only laches, not the three-year period, applied to these claims.1
Section 763(a) applies only to claims for personal injury or death,
recognized the court; maintenance and cure claims, on the other hand,
arose from the employment relationship and were "contractual in nature." 55 Hence, section 763(a) did not apply to them.
FORUM NON

CONVENIENS

Prior to 1987 the Fifth Circuit employed a modified forum non
conveniens analysis for maritime cases. That analysis began with a
choice of law analysis, followed by an inquiry into any convenience
factors. The choice of law analysis was heavily weighted in this process
and usually was determinative. In In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, Louisiana,5 6 an en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly
overruled its earlier decisions and abandoned the modified approach,
adopting the standard forum non conveniens analysis outlined in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.57 Under the Reyno approach, the choice of law

is but one of a number of factors the court must consider in evaluating
the convenience of the forum. Henceforth, the forum non conveniens
question in all cases, whether maritime or not, is to be decided under
the Reyno formula.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

849 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1988).
682 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
Id. at 338.
Id.at 337.
821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
454 U.S. 235, 102 S. Ct. 252 (1981).
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Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A. A. 5 8 was one of the first maritime
forum non conveniens cases decided after In re Air Crash Disaster. In
Gonzalez, the Peruvian survivors of a Peruvian sailor who had been
killed as a result of an incident occurring on a Peruvian flag vessel in
Port Arthur, Texas brought suit in federal district court in Texas. After
the district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens, the case proceeded to trial and judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that
the court had erred in denying the motion and remanded the case for
dismissal of the action, even though the case had proceeded to judgment.
Explaining its decision, the panel noted that although In re Air Crash
Disaster had rejected the modified maritime forum non conveniens
approach, under which choice of law was the predominant, if not the
determinative, factor, choice of law still remains an important consideration. 9 The panel then reviewed the Lauritzen-Rhoditi 60factors, which
govern the choice of law issue in maritime matters, and concluded that
Peruvian law applied. This and other facts, the court concluded, suggested that Peru would be the superior forum.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the forum non conveniens doctrine and the relationship between state and federal courts
in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.6' The plaintiff was the survivor
of a shipwright who had been killed in an accident while repairing a
vessel in Singapore. After determining that the law of Singapore and
not the American maritime law applied, the district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to the claims
brought under the Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act, and general
maritime law. The court then conditionally dismissed the rest of the
plaintiff's claims on the ground of forum non conveniens. After this
dismissal, the plaintiff filed a separate suit in Texas state court, asserting
wrongful death claims under Texas and Singapore law. The defendant
then returned to federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting the
plaintiff from proceeding in state court on any of the causes of action
alleged. 62 The federal court granted this relief and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
On petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court begin its
analysis by noting that the federal district court's prior order dismissing

58. 832 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. 832 F.2d at 879.
60. Id. at 881. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-93, 73 S. Ct. 921, 92834 (1953); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09, 90 S. Ct. 1731, 173334 (1970).
61. 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988).
62. The plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment that the prior dismissal from
federal court foreclosed all the causes of action that had been brought in the state court.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

several of the plaintiff's claims on forum non conveniens grounds did
not resolve the merits of these claims under Singapore law. Thus, the
Court concluded, to the extent that the injunction prohibited the plaintiff from proceeding in Texas state court on the Singapore law claims,
it exceeded the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act. 63 The Court further
observed, however, that the district court's determination that Singapore
law applied to the claims was an adjudication on a substantive law
point. Consequently, the court explained, to the extent that the injunction prevented the relitigation of the choice of law issue, it was
was proper and did not run afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act. The
effect of this ruling was that the state court had to apply the federal
court's choice of law. Having done that, the Texas court was then free
to apply its own forum non conveniens analysis and either dismiss the
case or try the case according to Singapore law.
LHWCA
Preemption
Many of the recent developments surrounding the LHWCA involve
questions of federal preemption of state law. Two Fifth Circuit cases,
Atkinson v. Gates, McDonald & Co.64 and Texas Employers Insurance
Association v. Jackson,61 dealt with whether the Act's penalty provisions
for nonpayment of benefits, together with the exclusivity clause in
section 5(a), 66 preempt state law claims based upon bad faith insurance
practices. In each case the plaintiff alleged that his LHWCA insurer
had acted in bad faith when it terminated his compensation and medical
benefits, and each plaintiff had initiated suit in state court. In both
cases the Fifth Circuit concluded that the LHWCA preempts any state
law claim based upon an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay benefits
due under the Act, even though the Act contains no express preemptive
language. The court, however, subsequently granted a rehearing en banc
in Texas Employers,67 so that decision no longer carries precedential
authority.
The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Atkinson is not by any means an
aberration. Both the District of Columbia 68 and the Ninth 69 Circuits
likewise have answered the preemption question in the affirmative. The

63. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978).
64. 838 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1988).
65. 820 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 828 F.2d 1 (1987).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1986).
67. 828 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1987).
68. See Hall v. C & P Tele. Co., 809 F.2d 924, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
69. Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1019, 106 S. Ct. 1206 (1986).
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courts of appeal are not unanimous on this point, however. In Martin
v. Travelers Insurance Co.,70 the First Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA does
not protect insurers against state law claims that rest upon bad faith
insurance practices.
Another conflict between the LHWCA and state law surfaced in
the Louisiana state court case of Lewis v. Modular Quarters.7' The
question presented in Lewis was whether the exclusivity provision in
the Louisiana Workman's Compensation Act 72 (the Louisiana Act) bars
a subcontractor's employee who is receiving benefits under the LHWCA
from asserting a state law tort claim against the general contractor.
The Louisiana Third Circuit held that the receipt of LHWCA benefits
does not preempt the application of a state law defense when the cause
of action itself is grounded in state law. Thus, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's state law tort claim was subject to the exclusivity
provision of the Louisiana Act. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused
to review the case and the United States Supreme Court later denied
the application for certiorari.
The position taken in the Lewis decision has both supporters and
detractors at the federal appellate court level. On the one hand, the
decision is consistent with the decision of the-Fourth Circuit in Garvin
v. Alumax of South Carolina, Inc.71 On the other hand, it appears to
4
be inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit's rulings in Gates v. Shell OiP
and Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding.71 One might be able to distinguish
Gates from Lewis, for in the former case, there may have been no
conflict between the LHWCA and state law. In Gates, the LHWCA
applied by virtue of the OCSLA. The OCSLA does adopt state law in
some circumstances as surrogate federal law, but only where the state
law does not conflict with federal law. Arguably, then, there could
have been no preemption question in Gates, for Louisiana law could
not apply through the OCSLA if it conflicted with the LHWCA.
However, Lewis is clearly at odds with Martin.
The recent Fifth Circuit decision in Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress
Co.7 6 addressed a related issue. The claim by the injured employee in
Griffis came within the concurrent jurisdiction of the LHWCA and the
Louisiana Act. After electing to receive benefits under the LHWCA,
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the employee brought a tort action against the general contractor. The
defendant promptly claimed the broader protection of Louisiana's exclusivity provision. On appeal from the district court's dismissal of the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. According to the court, section 5(a) 77 of the LHWCA does
not create any cause of action against third parties. The plaintiff's
cause of action, the court reasoned, therefore was grounded solely in
state law, and was not amenable to adjudication in the federal courts.
The Griffis decision does have at lease one virtue: it is consistent
with the Fifth Circuit's holdings in several cases, including May v.
TransworldDrilling Co. 78 Griffis, however, presents a quandary to those
plaintiffs who seek to avoid the pitfalls of the Louisiana appellate
court's decision in Lewis by filing a suit in a federal forum. One can
only hope that the United States Supreme Court will eventually take
up this question, as Justices White and Blackmun recommended in their
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lewis.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
In Beverly v. Action Marine Services, Inc. ,79 the Louisiana Supreme
Court addressed the issue of when state law may be applied to maritime
matters that fall within the scope of the LHWCA. The plaintiffs in
Beverly, the parents of an employee accidentally poisoned by fumes on
board a moored vessel, sought death benefits. The employer was in
the business of cleaning ocean-going vessels. Although the provisions
of the LHWCA clearly covered the deceased employee, the parents
could not have obtained recovery under that Act. Section 9 of the Act
requires that claimants seeking death benefits prove they were financially
dependent on the deceased, and the parents could not prove such
dependence. The parents therefore sought benefits under the Louisiana
Workers' Compensation Act, which, if applicable, would have afforded
them a recovery of $20,000 each.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, relying on Director, OWCP v. Perini
North River Associates,80 held that there is a "twilight zone" within
maritime law in which the federal and state courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction. Although the court acknowledged that the exact boundaries
of this concurrent jurisdiction zone are unclear, it concluded that the
zone at least encompasses persons, such as the decedent in Beverly, to
whom both the state compensation act and the LHWCA might apply.

77. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1986).
78.

786 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854, 107 S. Ct. 190 (1986).

See supra text accompanying note 2.
79. 433 So. 2d 139 (La. 1983).
80. 459 U.S. 297, 103 S. Ct. 634 (1983).
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The zone to which the Beverly court referred was first created by
the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Department of Labor &
Industries.' In that case, however, the Court faced a somewhat different
problem from that which confronted the Beverly court: when the injury
occurs in navigable waters but the case arguably falls within the "maritime but local" exception, should the federal courts respect the claimant's choice between the federal and state law remedy. Before Davis,
the Court had consistently ruled that there was no overlap between the
LHWCA and state compensation schemes, that the protection of one
left off where that of the other began. Because this "jurisdictional
dilemma" made it difficult for an injured worker to determine on which
side of the line his case fell, the result in some cases had been that
he obtained no compensation at all. To solve this problem, the Davis
court concluded that a strong presumption of constitutionality should
attach to the worker's choice of remedy. The effective result of this
ruling was the creation of a narrow zone within which the worker had
an option to choose either scheme of compensation. In the later case
of Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,82 however, the Supreme Court
took an entirely different approach to the problem. The Court held
that the language of the 1927 act did not prevent LHWCA coverage
of all work-related injuries that occur on navigable waters. The Calbeck
decision thus moved the coverage of the LHWCA firmly to the land's
edge and supplanted state law coverage up to that point.
In Perini, the United States Supreme Court ruled that if a worker
is injured while performing his job upon "actual navigable waters,"
he is "engaged in maritime employment" and is covered by the LHWCA.
In light of the principles enunciated in Calbeck and Perini,it is therefore
clear that the LHWCA covered the claimant in Beverly.
The Supreme Court created the twilight zone in Davis and other
cases in order to extend the coverage of the LHWCA landward. The
question squarely presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Beverly
was whether the Louisiana Act could, consistently with the federal
constitution, cover workers who are engaged in maritime employment
upon actual navigable waters. The court in Beverly relied on these same
cases-Davis, Calbeck, and Perini-to extend state compensation law
out over the waters edge.
In a decision rendered after Beverly, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
apparently departed from the rule of that case. In Logan v. Louisiana
Dock Co.,83 the trial court awarded compensation benefits under the
State Act to a claimant who had been injured while working on a
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floating dry dock in the Mississippi River. On appeal, the employer
contested the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that the claimant's exclusive remedy was under the LHWCA. For his part, the claimant
argued that the state court properly exercised jurisdiction because the
case fell within the Beverly zone of concurrent jurisdiction. The court
of appeal reversed, holding that there is no concurrent state jurisdiction
over cases that involve injuries to longshoremen sustained on dry-docked
vessels. The Logan court distinguished Beverly on the ground that the
plaintiffs in Beverly, because they could not prove their dependency
upon the decedent, had no remedy under the LHWCA. Thus, the Logan
court apparently concluded that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters arising out of injuries
sustained by maritime workers on navigable waters.
Definition of Employer
In Davidson v. Instar Corp. ,84 an OCSLA case, the Fifth Circuit
considered whether a joint venture can qualify as an "employer" for
purposes of the immunity provided by section 5(a) of the LHWCA
and, if so, what law defines the requirements for such a joint venture.
After summarily answering the first question in the affirmative, the
court proceeded to consider the plaintiff's argument that Louisiana law,
as surrogate federal law, should control in deciding whether the contracting parties in that case were joint venturers. The Fifth Circuit held
that whether a particular business constitutes a joint venture must be
determined by reference to the federal common law that existed at the
time of the LHWCA's enactment, not to state law. Applying that law
to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the defendants had
not in fact formed in a joint venture.
Subrogation
In Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co. ,8 the federal district court
addressed the applicability of Louisiana law to suits brought by employers to enforce compensation liens applied through the OCSLA.
After the employer paid LHWCA compensation benefits to the injured
employee pursuant to OCSLA, the employee pursued a third-party
action against CNG. The employer's insurance carrier then intervened
in the employee's suit and recovered on its lien for LHWCA benefits
paid. The attorneys for the employee contended that because the case
was governed by state law, which functioned as surrogate federal law,
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the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Moody v. Arabie86 applied.
In Moody, the Louisiana court had held that under Louisiana law a
plaintiff and his attorney are entitled to recover, out of the proceeds
assigned to the employer's workers' compensation lien, attorneys' fees
and a fair share of the costs incurred by the plaintiff in the prosecution
of his third party claim.
The Bartholomew court rejected the plaintiff's argument. According
to the court, Moody is inconsistent with federal law because, under
the LHWCA, the lien cannot be diminished in order to compensate
the plaintiff's attorney or to pay any of the plaintiff's costs. Hence,
Louisiana law did not apply to the case as surrogate federal law through
the OCSLA. As authority for this ruling the court cited the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.87 There
the federal appellate court held that a stevedore's lien for the compensation benefits he had paid to an injured longshoreman may not
be reduced by his proportionate share of legal expenses incurred by
the longshoreman in obtaining recovery from the shipowner. Bloomer,
the Bartholomew court concluded, established that the LHWCA is a
federal law contrary to the state law principle of sharing attorney fees,
which prevents the adoption of this state law as surrogate federal law
through the OCSLA.
The Fifth Circuit addressed a somewhat different compensation lien
issue in Taylor v. Bunge Corp.88 The injured worker brought a section
5(b) action against the employer, who also happened to be the owner
of the vessel, in its capacity as shipowner. The employer settled the
section 5(b) claim by paying an amount to the employee over and above
the compensation benefits it had already paid. As part of the settlement
agreement, the employer agreed to indemnify the employee against the
subrogation claims of its own workers' compensation insurance carrier.
When the carrier later attempted to enforce its lien against the employee,
the employer intervened. The employer argued that because it had agreed
to indemnify the plaintiff against the carrier's subrogation claims, the
carrier was actually suing its own insured (that is, the employer), an
action prohibited by Louisiana law.
The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument. As the court explained,
the argument ignored the fact that the law of admiralty and the LHWCA
treat the vessel as a third party, distinct from its owner. The workers'
compensation insurer in this case, the court noted, owed a duty to the
employer, but not to the vessel. Under the indemnification agreement,
however, it was the vessel, not the employer as employer, that guarantied

86. 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986).
87. 445 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980).
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indemnity to the employee. Because that was so, the court concluded
that the insurer's suit was not against the employer, but against the
vessel, which, as far as the insurer was concerned, was a third party.
The employer's dual capacity under maritime law thus operated to
preclude its claim to the benefits of Louisiana's insurance subrogation
laws.
Section 5(b)
In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc., 89 the Fifth
Circuit considered whether and under what circumstances section 5(b)
applies to time-charterers. In that case the claimant, an employee of
Ma-Ju, suffered injuries while performing his duties aboard a vessel
that Ma-Ju had chartered to Kerr-Magee. The court of appeal agreed
with the claimant that one can maintain a section 5(b) action against
a time-charterer, but concluded that the time-charterer is subject to
liability only for negligence in its time-charterer capacity. Thus, the
court indicated, there can be no liability under section 5(b) unless the
harm arises from the breach of some duty that either is within the
sphere of the charterer's traditional responsibilities or has been imposed
on the charterer through the charter agreement. In other words, the
time-charterer cannot be held accountable under section 5(b) for injuries
caused by factors that are more properly within the control of the
vessel owner.
Coverage
In Mills v. Director, OWCP,90 the Fifth Circuit further delineated
the circumstances in which LHWCA applies under OCSLA. The claimant was a land-based welder employed in a shipyard in Amelia, Louisiana. While he was working in a basket suspended from a land-based
crane, the claimant fell to the ground when the basket was dropped.
Beginning some six to twelve months earlier, the claimant had performed
welding services on an oil platform that was being constructed on shore.
That platform was destined for use on the outer continental shelf.
Both the administrative law judge and the Benefits Review Board
held that OCSLA does not extend LHWCA benefits to a worker such
as Mills. The work performed by Mills, they noted, did not actually
take place on the Outer Continental Shelf. On appeal the Fifth Circuit,
however, rejected a strict situs-of-the-work test, noting that such a test
is foreclosed by the language of LHWCA. Because the builder of the
platform specifically designed it solely for use and operation offshore
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on the shelf, the court held that OCSLA did extend LHWCA coverage
to Mills. Distinguishing Herb's Welding v. Gray,91 the court emphasized
that Mills's work, unlike that of the claimant in Herb's Welding, was
directly related to shelf operations.
The Mills court's approach to the question of LHWCA coverage
may be described as a "but for" test: the claimant will be entitled to
LHWCA benefits under OCSLA if he would not have been engaged
in the work out of which the injury arose but for operations then
taking place or soon to take place on the shelf. Nevertheless, the "but
for" test applied in Mills is not the simple causa sine qua non test of
tort law. The Mills test includes the requirement that the claimant show
a nexus between the work being performed and activities on the shelf. 92
Settlements
In Oceanic Butler, Inc. v. Nordahl,93 the injured worker died while
awaiting the deputy commissioner's approval of the settlement of his
LHWCA claim. After the worker's widow initiated a claim for death
benefits under the LHWCA, the employer and its insurer attempted to
withdraw from the previously proposed settlement agreement. The settlement agreement, however, did not provide that the employer or its
insurer could withdraw from the settlement in the event that the worker's
death preceded approval of the settlement.
On review of the Benefits Review Board's decision in favor of the
spouse, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. According to the court, a claimant's
obligation under a settlement agreement to accept the sum agreed upon
and to waive otherwise-payable lifetime compensation is unenforceable
until the appropriate administrative authority approves the agreement.
The court further concluded that, absent contrary provisions in the
settlement contract, an executed settlement agreement submitted for
administrative approval binds the employer and its insurance carrier
and is not subject to rescission at their election. As the court noted,
nothing in the LHWCA would have prevented the employer and its
insurer from including an express right of recission in the settlement
agreement.
DEATH ACTION

Beneficiaries' Rights
When death ensues as the result of a maritime tort, an action for
wrongful death may lie under the Jones Act, 94 the Death on the High

91. 766 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1985).
92. The Fifth Circuit has granted rehearing in Mills, 856 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1988).
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93. 842 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1988).
94. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1986); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. 1988).
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Seas Act (DOHSA), 95 or under the general maritime law. 96 In Calton
v. Zapata Lexington,97 the Fifth Circuit addressed two issues that may
arise in connection with maritime death actions: (1) whether the settlement of a Jones Act death claim by the personal representative of
a deceased seaman bars a subsequent suit by beneficiaries of the seaman
against the seaman's employer, and (2) if so, whether any remedy is
available to the beneficiaries.
In Calton, the children of the deceased seaman's first marriage,
unaware that the seaman's second wife had previously qualified as the
seaman's personal representative and had already entered into a settlement with their father's employer, sued the employer. The second wife's
settlement made no mention of the seaman's first marriage or children
of that marriage. Affirming the dismissal of the children's suit, the
Fifth Circuit cited precedent that prohibits a Jones Act beneficiary from
suing the employer in a proceeding separate from that instittued by
the deceased's personal representative. 98 The beneficiary's only recourse
is to sue the personal representative. 99
Right to Jury Trial
Is a jury trial available in a suit brought under the Death on the
High Seas Act and filed in a federal court pursuant to that court's
diversity jurisdiction? Two recent decisions from federal district courts
in New York and California demonstrate that the answer to this question
remains unsettled. In Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International,
Inc. ,10 the district court for the Southern District of New York held
that no jury trial is available in such a case. Citing Tallentire Offshore
Logistics, Inc.,10 the court concluded that the plaintiff had no right
to a jury trial of his wrongful death claims that had been brought in
federal court based on the DOHSA.10 2 The court further concluded that
the alternative jurisdictional predicate of diversity of citizenship could
lead to no different result. Justifying this conclusion, the court explained
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that diversity of citizenship creates only an additional basis for federal
jurisdiction; it does not enlarge the scope of the substantive remedy
provided under DOHSA. 03
The federal court for the Northern District of California reached
a different result in Favaloro v. S/S Golden Gate."°4 According to that
court, while there is no right to a jury trial in an action under federal
maritime jurisdiction, there is such a right in an action that is within
the federal diversity jurisdiction. The Favaloro court recognized the
complexities involved in a trial in which some claims rest solely upon
admiralty jurisdiction and others solely upon diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court concluded that a case should be tried before the
jury in its entirety, with the jury acting only in an "advisory capacity"
for the claims resting solely in admiralty. 0 5
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

According to some observers, permitting the owner of a pleasure
boat to claim the benefits of the limited liability afforded by the
Limitation Act' °6 is one of the most indefensible rules of maritime
law. 107 This critique apparently has gained some sympathizers on the
federal bench, for a number of recent decisions of several of the district
courts have held that the Act does not apply to pleasure vessels. 08 The
most recent decision evidencing this trend is Estate of Lewis, 0 9 a decision
handed down by the federal court for the Northern District of California. According to the Lewis court, Congress did not intend for the
Limitation Act to apply to such vessels and there are no policy considerations that might warrant extending it to them.
This recent trend of denying limited liability to the owners of
pleasure vessels is contrary to the language of the Limitation Act itself
as well as the overwhelming weight of earlier authority." 0 It remains
to be seen whether Estate of Lewis and the case law on which it relies
presage a wholesale jurisprudential reevaluation of the Limitation Act's
reach.
Assuming that one is eligible to take advantage of the limited
liability defense, one must be careful to take the appropriate steps to
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assert and preserve it. In Vatican Shrimp Co. v. Solis,"' the Fifth
Circuit addressed this problem. After the plaintiff filed a Jones Act
claim against it in state court, the defendant answered the petition and
pleaded the limitation provided by the Limitation Act as an affirmative
defense. The defendant also subsequently petitioned the federal district
court to limit its liability in the suit, but not until one and one-half
years after the filing of suit. Because the limitation petition had not
been filed within six months of notice of the claim, the district court
dismissed it on the ground that it was untimely. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Vatican Shrimp thus establishes a clear rule regarding the
assertion of the limitation defense: pleading the limitation as an affirmative defense in a state court action does not toll the six month
limitation period set forth in Rule F of the Supplemental Admiralty
Rules.
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